Remarks by:
Abbas Vali (University of Swansea, Wales)
WKI Conflict Resolution Forum
July 28, 1998

In my opinion, the Kurdish question in Iran is a product of modality. It has a very brief history, although Kurdish nationalists may like to dispute this point and argue for a longer history going back many centuries. In my opinion, the Kurdish question in Iran, as a question of identity, rights and civil and democratic liberties, is very modern.

It is barely a century old, and its history begins with the construction of the modern state in Iran, that is, the policies of territorial centralism, and the policies of the construction of a uniform Iranian national identity which were pursued by force by the first Pahlavi state from 1926 to '41, and then, after a short lull, were again taken up by the second Pahlavi state and continued up to 1979, the I ranian Revolution and the downfall of the monarcy. The Islamic Republic of Iran, despite its stark ideological and political differences with the previous regime, continued its policies in Kurdistan, and in a sense reimposed the existing system in Kurdistan, albeit by deploying more military force and coercion.

But Why do I emphasise the modernness of the Kurdish question in Iran and why this modernness is important? The reason is rather obvious. This is because it was the process of construction of the modern nation-state in Iran which actually transformed the very character of Kurdish politics, from tribal rebellions to the politics of rights and identity.

Now, if I criticized previous panelists for beating around the bush and not telling us what the exact question is, I canot do the same myself. So I must be specoific. I'm going to say that the Kurdish question in Iran is a question of denial of the Kurdish identity by the Sovereign power and the Kurds resistance to this denial. And this relationship of denial and resistance has existed ever since the formation of the modern state in Iran and continues to date.

Identity is not just what defines a person, or a larger collectivity. But rather it is what defines the rights, liberties and obligations of a person, or collectivity within a society, and to that extent, the nature of the Kurdish question, if considered as a question of identity and rights, depends very much on who is defining these rights and who is defining this identity.

For those who believe in Kurdish territorial nationalism in Iran, this is a question of national rights and national identity. Those who believe in Kurdish autonomy and rights within the juridico-political framework of Iranian sovereignty, it is a question of ethnic identity and rights.

However you see it, at the heart of this question is a dialectical relationship of denial and resistance, and insofar as this dialectic relations persists and this contradiction is not resolved, the Kurdish question is going to persist in Iran.

Now, the Kurdish question in Iran is rather curious question in the sense that the Kurds in Iran constitute only a relatively small section of the total population by comparison with Iraq and Turkey, something about 12 to 15 percent of the population of 60 to 65 million. However, as it happens the numerical weight of the Kurdish population in Iran is not that important. It cannot explain its actual political and cultural significance is which is immense, partly because of the status the Kurds have historically held in the discursive construction of the uniform Iranian national identity and partly because the persistence of the Kurdish Question is a constant reminder of the deficiencies and shortcomings of the citizenship, democracy, and democratic political process in Iran.

If we look at the Kurdish question as a question of the rights and liberties to which the Kurds in Iran aspire, we must look at what may be considered their juridico-political framework within the Iranian state, that is, the Iranian constitution.

In the Iranian constitution of 1905, we see a significant disparity, a significant incongruity, between the conditions of citizenship and conditions of political sovereignty. Sovereignty is derived from the collective will of the Iranian nation, while citizenship is effectively defined by the costituent elements of Persian ethnicity. This obvious difference between the conditions of sovereignty and the conditions of citizenship in Iran theoretically meant that the Kurds could enter the political process as citizens of the state only if they were prepared to deny certain aspects or defining elements of their identity, and this denial meant that the political process could never be democratic; even if free general elections were held periodically.

The incongruity between these two conditions was there ; it was the hallmark of the Iranian constitution under the monarchy. and it was also politically extremely significant. This is because when there was any attempt to express Kurdish identity or demand its recognition, the recogition of and respect for Kurdish rights an liberties in Iran, the government was able to link immediately with the question of political sovereignty, to treat it and present it as a clear danger to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. For once an issue is linked with the question of sovereignty, it could easily be excluded from the realm of everyday 'domestic' politics moving beyond the current political scene, becoming an issue above the ordinary day to day conduct of the business of government.

Now, the linking of the Kurdish identity to questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, or what our Turkish friend this morning rathe unfortunately called the peasant issue, significant as it was also proved very counter productive in so far as the democratic resolution of the Kurdish Question in Iran was concernrd. For it always enabled the Iranian government to treat it as a question of national security and sovereignty and effectively and immediately force it out of the political process into a military process, to present it as a military issue linked directly with the survival of the Iranian nation and the Iranian state. This is the very crux of issue underpining the official perception and representation of the Kurdish Question as a question of Iranian sovereignty and subsequent endoresement of the 'military solution' by the state. It was not therefore surprising to see the Kurds take part eagerly in the democratic process which led to the downfall of the monarchy and the formation of the Islamic republic. They had high hopes, but these hopes were not realized. And the lethal linkage between the Kurdish question and the Iranian national sovereignty and the survival of the state, continued to persist informing the discourse and practice of the Islamic regime.

But in the Islamic Republic of Iran, we have a rather curious condition insofar as the juridical-political framework of the conduct of politics, of legitimacy and authority, are concerned. A juridico-political frame for political conduct which is unique in the contemporary world. That is to say that in the Islamic Republic of Iran we actually have in the constitution of this state two conflicting and competing conceptions of sovereignty.

One is the concept of popular sovereignty, popular democratic sovereignty which is derived from the indivisible will of the Iranian nation, and this is inscribed in the Article I of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. And the other one is the divine concept of sovereignty, which is derived from God's will, which through the medium of Shi'i institutions of a Imamt is bestowed on the existing "faqih" as the dputy and representative of the Absent Shi'i Imam, the rightful ruler of the Umma the Islamic community, a perception which forms the foundation of Khomeinie's doctrine of the 'Velayat i Fagih' enshrined in the Iranian constitution in 1979. This divine conception of political sovereignty, which is inscribed in Article 5 of the constitution, is by definition indivisible, indisputable, unquestionable and absolute. It defines the predominance of the living "faqih" as the supreme source of authority and legitimacy whose absolute will defines the boundaries of political power and the juridical-political framework of the conduct of the state.

The presence of these two incompatible and conflicting conceptions of Sovereignty, authority and legitimacy have always been a bone of contention in the Iranian politics, often defining the ideological contours political power struggle among the contending forces. The democratic forces and the advcates of civil and democratic liberties in Iran have tried to get rid of the divine conception of sovereignty and give the popular-democratic conception its due place in the constitution.

But the Kurdish question has occupied a very curious place in the on-going struggle between the contending forces in the Islamic Republic since its inception. For it is the only question in Iran where these two conceptions of sovereignty easily converge and supplement each other in the political process. This point requires a brief explanation.

Let us consider the so-called special policy of government in Kurdistan (Siyasat-e Veejeh-yeh Dowlat dar Kurdistan), which basically meant the military suppression any expression of Kurdish identity, and which was carried out by the direct order of the living Fagih, Ayatollah Khomeinei, who was also its author and initiator. The policy was formulated practiced and publically justified in the name of the sanctity of a universal, inclusive and indivisible Islamic identity, which surpassed all ethnic and national identities, divisions and expressions.

But it is interesting to note that when this special policy of the government was carried out in Kurdistan, the outcome was absolutely different; it had nothing to do with the sovereignty of God. The special policy had simply served to reimpose the Iranian national identity, defined in terms of Persian ethnicity, language and culture, on Kurdistan.

This brief explanation would suffice to highlight the special place that the Kurdish question occupies in the democratic process in Iran. It is, in fact, one of the very important areas where the democratic and civil liberties and the struggle to reform the state and society effectively converge on one another.

This much said about the nature and political character of the Kurdish Question in Iran, now I would like to talk about the present situation in the Islamic Republic. Undoubtedly the political conditions which have prevailed in Iran since the last presidential elections in June 1997 is extremely important and very crucial. It is an upheaval which is probably unparalleled in the history of the Islamic Republic ever since it was instituted in 1979. It is fundamentally different from previous instances of political factionalism and power struggle and infighting in the Islamic Republic.

The present crisis in Iran is rooted in the popular quest for the democratisation of the state and society and the coservative reaction and opposition to it. The scale of crisis is unprecedented, it is countrywide and the conservative opposition to reform has already taken the form of an undemocratic resistence to democratic change initiated from below, as witnessed by the election of Khatami against all the odds.The movement which has since been behind the president supporting his call for democracy and civil society is a popular democratic movement for a democracy, and its foundation has been laid inadvertently by the Islamic Republic itself which, in the course of the last ten years, has initiated and enacted a massive and large scale process of denationalization of state-owned industries and commercal concerns.

So in a sense this on-going process of denationalisations have laid the economic foundation for the movement. There is now a geniune demand for the democratisation of the political process in Iran. The statistical evidence is overwhelming. In the last presidential elections around 80% of the voting population of Iran, roughly 22 million out of 28 million, cast their votes in favour of Khatami, that is in faour of democracy and civil rights and liberties. Now, this can hardly be a tactical vote. And I must add that in this election popular the support in Kurdistan for Khatami was overwhelming as is clearly shown by the statistical analysis of the voting behaviour in the country. This level of popular participation in the elections in Kurdistan is in itself is very significant. We should bear in mind that the Kurds refused to participate in the referendum to ratify the Islamic identity of the post-revolutionary state. Nor did they vote for the constitution of the Islamic Republic. This was also the case in the previous presidential elections; the Kurds stayed away.

Furthermore, there is another factor distinguishing the current political crisis from the previous instances of political factionalism and internal power struggle. That is, at present the ruling or power bloc in Iran, the Shi'i clergy and their non- clerical support within the state and the society at large, is deeply divided. This division is by no means confined to the apparatuses of the state but run very deep in society, economy and polity as a whole.

But this not the only factor which differentiates the current political crisis from the previous ones. There is another and equally important factor which must be taken into consideration. That is the discursive presentation of the political power struggle within the regime: the discursive terms in which differences, divisions and conflicts among the contending forces are being represented in the political and ideological fields. The current political power struggle is represented not so much in terms of two competing interpretations of Islam, as was the case in 1981 in the conflict between Bank-Sadr and the leadership of the Islamic Republican Party, as in terms of demand for the demcratisation of the state, expansion of civil society and the creation of a legal order and anti- democratic opposition to it. The popular quest for democracy and civil society, represented by the reformist faction within the regime seriosly challenges the status of the doctrine of the Velayat i Fagih and questions its legitimacy. This in my opinion is a novel phenomenon in the Iranian politics, unprecedented since the formation of the Islamic Republic. It is of fundamental importance and cannot be dismissed by the forces of opposition. For as long as this doctrine defines the form and character of political authority, the conditions of political legitimacy and the juridico-political boundaries of the conduct of the state in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, there is simply no hope for any significant political reform and change. The importance of this point becomes apparent if we bear in mind that the chronic political, social, organisational and intellectual weakness of the secular opposition to the Islamic Republic has been the main reason for its survival and continuation. It is this chronic weakness of the secular opposition ever since the revotution which has led to the internalisation of political power struggle within the ruling religious power bloc in the first place. This is the political truth of the current political crisis in Iran: the secular opposition is totally absent from the political and ideological field.

So, given this situation, what is the most important task of the Kurdish political forces in Iran. I will skip over the detail and be very brief. But first I must make a point regarding the political status of the Kurdish forces. In my opinion, the Kurdish forces in Iran are political ineffective at present. They are largely out of the Iranian conditions, and they do not really have the power or capacity to influence the course of events inside Iran. In short they have no active political presence in the Kurdish territory and their military operations, minimal as it is, is reactive rather than proactive.

Having said this, I must also say that the Kurdish political forces in Iran have almost an in-built legitimacy. They can revive overnight, and it has been shown time and again since the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1946. So despite their weakness they cannot be dismissed. They must be taken into account in the developing political conditions in Iran.

So the legitimacy and popularity of the Kurdish political forces means that they are still significant and can influence the course of events in Kurdistan, but only if they swim with the current not against it. Their policies thus far has been costly and ineffective, if not largely counter productive. It is indeed the high time for the Kurdish political forces in Iran to decide, to come out of obscurity and take a new position and change the negative direction of Kurdish politics. And this means that they have to enter the process of political power struggle in Iran but on the side of the forces of democratisation and reform and against the enemies of democracy and civil and political rights and liberties.

Clearly in the context of traditional political and strategic thinking in Kurdistan it is easier said than done. I am aware that taking such a step involves radical changes in policy and practice with radical implications for their politica programmes and strategic objectives. I think this change of direction in Kurdish politics at present can only be achieved if the strategy of arms struggle is dropped. This strategy has proved counter-productive and costly, both in human and material terms. It has been negatinve and unethical leading to dependency on one of the worst and most cruel dictatorships in the contemorary world. Armed struggle has considerably undermined the political and organisational basis of the Kurdish political forces, alienating them from urban population and life. It has sapped their intellectual energy leading, more often than not, to the exclusion of the good and able and the domination of the mediocre in the party organisation. And above all armed struggle has been a major obstacle in the development of a proactive politics in Kurdistan. It is the high time to rethink this strategy and change the direction of Kurdish politics.

Armed struggle in the Iranian Kurdistan has failed. This is a political fact and the Kurdish political forces should accept it publically and without hesitation. In so doing they should give up the slogan calling for the armed destruction of the regime in Iran. To call the people to arms without an effective political strategy and the necessary political, economic, organisational and intellectual resources to support it is not just bad politics, it is criminal. And we know they do not have such political strategy and the resources to support it. So let us be realistic, we are living in a real world. In short, if the Kurdish political forces in Iran wish to change the course and direction of their policies and come out political obscurity and join the growing popular movement for democracy, they must abandon this unrealistic demand and exclude the slogan from their political and ideological discourse. In the current situation this is not just a political necessity but also a logical imperative. For you cannot expect to ake part in a popular political process which is currently being spearheaded by a reformist faction within the regime and at the same call for the armed destruction of the regime. Thit is not just a bad policy, it is a contradiction in terms.

But having said that I must clarify an important point, in order to avoid misunderstanding. It is a sensetive issue and easy to be misunderstood and I do not wish to be misunderstood. I wish to make it clear that the argument to end the strategy of armed struggle is not an argument for disarming and surrender to the regime. On the contrary, it is argument for a proactive policy to join a popular political process in pursuit of sepecfic political objectives; objectives which are rooted in the civil and democratic rigths and liberties emanating from the official recognition of Kurdish identity in Iran. This have been the objectives of the Kurdish political forces all along and the bloody history of their struggle shows that they can only be realised in a democratic political process. It is true that the outcome of the proposed change in the course and direction of Kurdish politics is not guaranteed, it may not ensure the realisation of the Kurdish political objectives, wholey or partially. In the current political situation in Iran the outcome depends primarily on the outcome of the political power struggle among the contending political forces within the regime. But this struggle is by no means confined to the inner circles of the regime in the state apparatuses, it is deeply rooted in the popular political process within the Iranian society at large. It has divided the ruling power bloc but failed to polarise the population, and the majority are behind the call for reform, democracy, legality and civil society. And this is the crux of the issue. For it means that a likely victory of the hardline conservative forces within the regime, by political-military means including a coup de etate against the reformist forces, will only be shortlived. It will not effect the democratic political forces which generate and sustain the movement.

Nor those the likely victory of the reformist forces within the regime automatically guarantees the realisation of the Kurdish objectives. Although in this case the odds are not wholey against the Kurds and a partial realisation of their objectives, even without a detailed and comprehensive programme for administrative autonomy, could be seen as a victory for democracy and civil society in Kurdistan. In fact it is not unlikely that in the event of their victory Khatami and his associates within the regime will only allow for a partial recognition of Kurdish demands. In fact, given the transnational character of Kurdish identity and politics and culture, this may well be the case. But even in power politics there is a limit to transgression. Khatami and his associates and supporters must know that their conception of civil society can only be meaningful if this society is prepared to respect national, ethnic, and cultural difference, and honour the political and civil rights of the other. The Kurds can always take up their guns and return to their lonley mountains.

Thank you.